

Network Security (NetSec)

IN2101 - WS 17/18

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Def.: Communications protocol

Problem 1

Problem 2

Recap (Theoretical Comp. Sci.): Chomsky Hierarchy

Problem 3

More on Problem (3): "Weird Machines"

Problem 4

Problem: Mutual Understanding

Examples

Literature and Sources



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Literature and Source

Def.: Communications protocol



- Defines the procedure and the format of exchanged messages
- Examples
 - IP
 - TCP
 - UDP
 - HTTP
 - HTTPS
 - SSH
 - ...
- · Alice and Bob might speak the same protocol ...
- but do they also have the same understanding?



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Literature and Source



- Assume you own zombo.com
- Then, all subdomains ★. zombo.com also belong to you
- And you can buy certificates for them



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- What about

www.paypal.com\0www.zombo.com

- where \0 is the C string terminator (NULL character)
- If a browser accidentally uses strncmp to validate certificates . . .



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- What about

www.paypal.com\0www.zombo.com

- where \0 is the C string terminator (NULL character)
- If a browser accidentally uses strncmp to validate certificates . . .
- ...you just got a certificate for www.paypal.com



- Alice and Bob spoke the same "protocol": X.509
- But had a different understanding!
- Alice certified the URL: www.paypal.com\0www.zombo.com
- Bob parsed the URL: www.paypal.com

Problem (1)



· Coder's implicit assumption

Input is well-formed

Reality

Input is controlled by attacker

Solution (1)



- Apply full recognition to inputs before processing them!
- Do not scatter recognition throughout your code!





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Problem ¹

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My favorite RFC

Content-Length = 1*DIGIT
[...]

Any Content-Length field value greater than or equal to zero is valid. Since there is no predefined limit to the length of a payload, a recipient MUST anticipate potentially large decimal numerals and prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion overflows

Quiz: Which RFC is this taken from?



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- · Quiz: Which RFC is this taken from?
 - 7230, HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing



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- Quiz: Which RFC is this taken from?
 - 7230, HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing
- Translation:
 - · The length of the content can be arbitrary
 - The length of the Content-Length field can be arbitrary
 - Just parse it right



- What type of grammar is HTTP?
- In the Chomsky hierarchy, at least type 1 context-sensitive



- What type of grammar is HTTP?
- In the Chomsky hierarchy, at least type 1 context-sensitive
- Are two HTTP parsers equivalent?

UNDECIDABLE

Recap (Theoretical Comp. Sci.): Chomsky Hierarchy



Grammar	Language	Recognized by
Type 3	Regular	Finite state automaton
Type 2	Context-free	Pushdown automaton
Type 1	Context-sensitive	Some weird stuff
Type 0	recursively enumerable	Turing machine

Type 3 $\,\subset\,$ Type 2 $\,\subset\,$ Type 1 $\,\subset\,$ Type 0

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• Remember all those undecidable problems in theo. comp. sci.?

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- Remember all those undecidable problems in theo. comp. sci.?
- If the grammar of your protocol is Type 1 or Type 0, you will run into them!

Solution (2)



- Don't define Turing-complete protocols
 - Recognizing is undecidable
 - · Testing equivalence of different implementations is undecidable
- With Content-Length fields, you easily run into this problem!





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You are visiting my website



- · You are visiting my website
- I host a hidden list of links to the most common porn sites



- · You are visiting my website
- I host a hidden list of links to the most common porn sites
- Your browser renders
 - Not visited: blue
 - Visited: purple



- · You are visiting my website
- I host a hidden list of links to the most common porn sites
- Your browser renders
 - Not visited: blue
 - · Visited: purple
- Using JavaScript, the color of the links is send back to me

Solution (3)



- Reduce computing power
- Power that is not there cannot be exploited
- In particular in input handling code



More on Problem (3): "Weird Machines"



- Complex protocols require complex parsers
- Complex parsers (anything beyond Type 2 and 3) expose almost unlimited computational power to the attacker
- · Which leads to "weird machines"
- A weird machine is a machine programmable by an attacker
- Which was not intended or expected by the programmer

Solution (3) part 2



- Make your protocol context-free or regular
- And use an appropriate parser
 - Parser generators, parser combinators, ...
 - import re is not an acceptable solution





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Problem: Mutual Understanding

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Example: Ponies vs. Cats



https://www.google.de/webhp?ie=UTF-8&q=ponies&q=cats

Example: Ponies vs. Cats



https://www.google.de/webhp?ie=UTF-8&q=ponies&q=cats

• Alice: "The user asked for ponies"

Bob: "The user asked for cats"

Example: Ponies vs. Cats



https://www.google.de/webhp?ie=UTF-8&q=ponies&q=cats

- Alice: "The user asked for ponies"
- Bob: "The user asked for cats"
- Google: "Let's go for both (cats preferred)"



Problem: Mutual Understanding



- Entities may have a different understanding of the meaning of a protocol
- In the example
 - Alice recognized the first q parameter
 - Bob recognized the last q parameter

Solution (4)



- Messages must be interpreted the same by all participants
- Parsers must be equivalent
- Only decidable for regular and context-free languages





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
Problem 4

Examples

Literature and Sources




- · Familiar from exercises
- Every message is delimited by a '\n'
- Nice library support: sf.readline()
- Language is Regular (Type 3)



JSON




Context Free (Type 2)





Context Free (Type 2)



 $\bullet \quad \text{But: If unique keys are required} \rightarrow \text{no longer context-free}$



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- Len Sassaman, Meredith L. Patterson, Sergey Bratus, Michael E. Locasto, Anna Shubina, Security Applications of Formal Language Theory, 2013, http://langsec.org/papers/langsec-tr.pdf
- http://langsec.org/
- Photoshopped protest signs by Kythera of Anevern (www.anevern.com)